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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DIANA CHILDS, ] 
(fka Diane Callahan) ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, ] 
Respondent/Appellee. ] 
> Court of Appeals 
) Case No. 990051-CA 
1 Priority 15 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The Appellant, Diana Childs, pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, respectfully submits this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah. 
Questions Presented for Review 
Appellant presents the following questions for this Court's review: 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's 
ruling that Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998), relying on its prior ruling in 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) precluded a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce to award Petitioner a share of that portion of 
Respondent's military retirement which accrued to him during the marriage in spite of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
implementation language of the Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act 
(hereinafter "USFSPA") 10 USCA §1401? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's 
holding that Respondent's post-decree return to military service and subsequent 
entitlement to a military retirement, which utilized thirteen (13) years of active duty 
service that had accrued to him during the parties' marriage, was not a substantial factual 
change in circumstances which warranted a modification of the Decree? 
3. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to find factual changes 
of circumstances where Petitioner's allegations of those changes were unopposed by 
Respondent? 
Reference to official and unofficial reports of any opinions issued by Court of 
Appeals 
A copy of the Court of Appeals opinion is set forth in Appendix "A". The opinion 
was reported at 384 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (1999). 
Statement of Grounds upon Which Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is Invoked 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion on December 9, 1999. 
1. There have been no orders respecting either a rehearing or an 
extension of time in this matter. 
2. There is no reliance made upon Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, since this is not a cross-petition. 
2 
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This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
2-2(3)(a) 1953, as amended. This Writ of Certiorari is sought in order to review an order 
of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the final order of the trial court disposing of all 
claims of the parties. 
Controlling and Determinative Authorities 
Controlling statutory provisions are set forth in their entirety in Appendix "B" 
hereto. 
A. Federal Statutes: The Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection 
Act, (hereinafter "USFSPA") 10 USCA §1401, et seq.9 legislatively overrides the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in McCartv v. McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 
L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981), which precluded the division of military retirements in State 
divorce proceedings. The relevant portion of USFSPA is 10 USCA § 1401(c)(1) which 
relates to modification of divorce decrees that were entered between June 26, 1981, and 
February 1, 1983, the effective date of USFSPA. That period is generally known as the 
"gap" period of the USFSPA. 
B. Utah Statutes: The primary statutory provision regarding the 
allocation of property in a divorce action is U.C.A. §30-3-5, etseq., (1953), as amended. 
Statement of Case 
A. Nature of Case, This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari from an 
order of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the Second Judicial District Court, 
3 
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Honorable Roger Dutson, which granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss a petition to 
modify the parties'divorce decree. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, Petitioner filed a 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, based upon substantially changed 
circumstances, which included the vesting of Respondent's military retirement subsequent 
to the divorce, as well as the enactment of the USFSPA which removed the prior 
prohibition against a division of that military retirement. 
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), or in the 
alternative, 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court, over Petitioner's objections and her unopposed affidavits, granted 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
On December 9, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of Petitioner's Petition to Modify. 
G. Statement of Relevant Facts, 
1. The Decree of Divorce was issued on March 10, 1982. 
2. The Decree addressed the issues of custody, alimony and 
property, but the issue of Respondent's military retirement was not, and in fact could not 
be, addressed at the time of the Decree because: a) the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 
McCartvv.McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed2 589 (U.S. 1981), 
precluded allocation of military retirement by state courts in divorce cases; and, b) 
Respondent was not vested in and, because of his non-affiliation with any military 
4 
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reserve unit, apparently had no foreseeable possibility of becoming vested in a military 
retirement at the time the Decree of Divorce was granted. (R.001, R.033, R.051, R.058, 
Court of Appeals opinion, Tf4) 
3. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, Respondent 
had separated from the U.S. Marine Corps after having accumulated thirteen (13) years 
towards the minimum of twenty (20) years of service required before he could retire from 
the military. (R.002, R.057, Court of Appeals opinion %l) 
4. At the time of the divorce Respondent had no affiliation with 
the Marine Corps nor any reserve component, nor had he had any such affiliation for 
more than three years prior to the divorce. (R.003, R.058) 
5. Petitioner did not know when Respondent entered the reserve 
component and began to accrue the additional seven years which would entitle him to a 
reserve component retirement that was based in large part upon the 13 years active duty 
which accrued during the parties' marriage. (R.003) 
6. In 1985, the parties returned to court to have Respondent's 
child support obligation modified. At that time, Respondent did not disclose any income 
from a reserve forces assignment, nor any participation in any reserve activities. (R. 028, 
R.034) 
7. From the date of the Decree of Divorce until January 1998, 
Petitioner was unaware that Respondent's additional military service would vest him with 
5 
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a retirement benefit or that she might be entitled to one-half of the portion of that benefit 
which had accrued during the parties' marriage. (R.002, R.028) 
8. After having become aware, through reading a newspaper 
article, that she might be entitled to a portion of Respondent's military retirement, and 
learning from her children that Respondent was participating in a reserve unit, Petitioner 
made efforts to contact an attorney who might be qualified to represent her in this matter. 
After speaking with three attorneys who did not feel qualified to deal with such a 
specialized matter, Petitioner was referred to her current attorneys, all of whom are 
military reservists and familiar with military retirement issues. (R.002, R.058, R.059, 
Court of Appeals opinion T|6) 
9. Although the trial court never permitted discovery or evidence 
from Respondent, it appears that he is now qualified to receive military retirement 
benefits. While Respondent will not actually receive military retirement benefits until his 
60th birthday, in June 2003, it appears that he is now vested in that retirement program as 
a result of now having completed service that totals at least twenty (20) years. (R.051, 
R.058) 
10. Because Petitioner's Motion to Modify the Decree was 
summarily dismissed by the Court, she was denied the opportunity to further develop 
through discovery the factual basis for this and other relevant changes of circumstances 
which would entitle her to a modification of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 141-145) 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11. Although Respondent produced no evidence nor affidavits to 
contradict Petitioner's affidavits, the Court of Appeals held that there had been no 
substantial change of circumstances, either in the law or factually, sufficient to justify 
reopening the divorce decree. (Court of Appeals Opinion, Tflfll, 13) 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
First Issue 
Writ of Certiorari should issue because the Utah Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the trial court's ruling that Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 
(Utah App. 1998), relying on its prior ruling in Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) precluded a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce to award the Petitioner a share of 
that portion of the military retirement which accrued to Respondent 
during the marriage in spite of the implementation language of the 
Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (hereinafter 
"USFSPA") 10 USCA §1401. 
For reasons shown below, this Court should grant certiorari under either 
subparagraphs (2) or (3) of Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
InMcCartvv. McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981), 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state court could not award an interest in a military 
retirement to a former spouse as a division of property in a divorce action. The Court 
based its ruling on public policy and stated that "the application of community property 
law conflicts with the Federal military retirement scheme regardless of whether retired 
pay is defined as current or as deferred compensation.55 453 U.S. 223, 69 L.Ed 2d at 600. 
7 
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In response to McCarty. Congress passed the Uniform Services Former Spouse's 
Protection Act which legislatively reversed McCarty and permitted states to divide and 
distribute military retirement benefits in divorce actions according to state law. 10 USCA 
§ 1408(c)(1); S.Rep. No. 97-502, U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News 1982 (July 22, 1982). 
Section 1408(c)(1) of the Act specifically provides for retroactive application of the Act 
with respect to divorce decrees entered during the period between McCarty (June 8, 
1981) and the date that the Act became effective (February 1, 1983). 
Petitioner in this matter was divorced squarely within the period of time for which 
retroactive application was intended by Congress - the so-called "gap" period. 
Utah state law, as set forth in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
allows for the division of retirement benefits that accrued during a marriage. As such, but 
for the McCarty decision, Petitioner should have been granted a portion of Respondent's 
military retirement which accrued during the marriage. 
At the time that this Court, in Woodward changed the law to allow our courts to 
divide retirement benefits, it made no provision for the retroactive application of the 
concept. As a result, in Throckmorton, the Court of Appeals held that Mrs. 
Throckmorton could not retroactively modify her decree of divorce to obtain a share of 
Mr. Throckmorton's civil service retirement which had accrued during their marriage. 
Since the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-
615, effective May 7, 1985) did not provide for any retroactive application of its 
provisions, the logic of Throckmorton was clearly appropriate to the facts of that case. 
8 
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Citing Guffevv. LaChance. 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634 (Az.Ct.App. 1980), Judge 
Billings in Throckmorton wrote that: 
. . . 'there is a compelling policy interest favoring the finality 
of property settlements' and this policy would be 'greatly 
undermined if the court were to allow the potential for re-
examination of every military divorce prior to enactment of 
the [Arizona] rule'. 767 P.2d at 124. 
In Guffev the Arizona court was actually dealing with a military retirement, but it 
was a pre-McCarthy and pre-USFSPA Arizona divorce decree. The analysis was based 
strictly upon Arizona law, and the public policy underlying that law at that time. In 
Throckmorton, the Court of Appeals clearly felt that this policy consideration applied to 
Civil Service Retirement or other retirements addressed by Woodward where there was 
no contrary expression of public policy. 
Unfortunately, when the Court of Appeals applied this principal to the post-
USFSPA military retirement in Toone. it implied a public policy position that was 
diametrically opposed to the explicit public policy set forth by Congress in the USFSPA. 
That Act specifically provides for the retroactive modification of those decrees of divorce 
that were entered during the "gap". The decree in this case, unlike that in Toone. fits 
squarely into this "gap" and Petitioner is clearly a member of the class of people which 
Congress intended to benefit by this provision. 
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals applied the Throckmorton analysis to 
the Toone case because it did not need to dispose of the case on that basis. It could have 
denied Mrs. Parkhurst's (Toone's) modification on two grounds that were totally 
9 
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consistent with the USFSPA: 1) As Judge Greenwood states in Toone. that divorce did 
not take place during the "gap" period. In fact, "USFSPA became effective prior to the 
1983 final divorce decree of Toone and Parkhurst". 952 P.2d at 114; 2) The trial court in 
Toone had considered and had allocated retirement benefits in the original decree, even 
though it had not specified whether a particular value or consideration had been given to 
Mr. Toone's military pension. 952 P.2dat 113. 
Toone can be specifically distinguished from the present case in a number of 
ways: 
1. In Toone, the Decree of Divorce was entered on December 16, 
1983, some ten months after the effective date of the USFSPA and after the closure of the 
"gap" for which retroactive application of the statute was provided. 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce was granted on March 10, 1982 - squarely 
within that "gap" period. 
2. In Toone, the petitioner raised the issue of retirement at trial, but did 
not address the military retirement specifically.. 
In this case, because McCarty was the Federal law at the time, Petitioner was 
precluded from raising the issue of military retirement. 
3. In Toone, Mr. Toone was eligible for military retirement at the time 
of the divorce. 
10 
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In this case, not only was Respondent not eligible for military retirement at the 
time of the divorce, he had never indicated any intent to obtain the additional service 
necessary for him to vest in such a retirement. 
4. In Toone. the Court of Appeals held that a change in the law was not 
a substantial change of circumstance which would justify the modification of a decree of 
divorce. In making its decision it relied upon its own decision in Throckmorton which 
had interpreted the Woodward opinion of this Court as not being subject to retroactive 
application. The logic of the opinion was that Woodward had not provided for 
retroactive application and it would be against public policy for the Court of Appeals to 
do so with respect to the Throckmorton civil service retirement. 
In this case, the USFSPA contains an explicit expression of public policy with a 
provision which allows for retroactive application of the statute for decrees that were 
entered within the "gap" period. Petitioner is a member of the class of persons which 
Congress intended to benefit from this retroactive application clause. 
5. In Toone the petitioner, in spite of the timing of her divorce, 
apparently relied solely upon the change of law under the USFSPA as her "substantial 
change of circumstances" to justify a modification of the decree. Mr. Toone was already 
vested in and receiving his retirement when the decree was entered. 
In this case, Petitioner is relying on two "substantially changed circumstances" -1) 
a change in the law which now specifically allows her claim; and 2) a separate factual 
change of circumstances. 
11 
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Second Issue 
Writ of Certiorari should issue because the Utah Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the trial court's holding that the Respondent's post-decree 
return to military service and subsequent entitlement to a previously non-
existent military retirement, which utilized thirteen (13) years of active 
duty service that had accrued to him during the parties' marriage, was not 
a substantial factual change in circumstances which warranted a 
modification of the Decree. 
In order for members of the military to be vested with non-disability retirement 
benefits, they must have completed a minimum of twenty (20) years of creditable military 
service, either through full-time active duty service or part-time reserve service. 
McCartv. 453 U.S. at 214. 
In 1979 Respondent separated from the U.S. Marine Corps after serving on active 
duty for thirteen years. At the time that he separated from the military, he had not 
accrued enough creditable years to vest in any retirement benefits. When the parties in 
this action divorced in 1982, Respondent had not been affiliated with the military in any 
capacity for more than three years and had never indicated any intention of returning to 
any form of military duty. 
Even if the Decree in Ibis matter had been entered after USFSPA, Petitioner would 
not have had any right to a portion of Respondent's military retirement at the time of the 
divorce because Respondent himself had no rights to a pension nor any foreseeable 
expectation of getting any. At the time of the divorce, Respondent had only a fragment of 
service that had no value to him and from which Petitioner could not receive any value. 
12 
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However, at some time since 1985 Respondent re-affiliated with the military and 
now appears to have reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in a branch of the military 
reserve forces. While the lower court's decision dismissing the Petition to Modify 
precluded discovery on the issue, it appears, because of the rank that Respondent has 
attained, that he now has at least twenty (20) years of creditable service toward a 
retirement. At a minimum, even if he has not earned the retirement to date, there is now a 
substantial likelihood that he will vest in the retirement in the future. 
The fact that Respondent had no prospect of reaching twenty (20) years of 
creditable military service at the time of the divorce, but has reached that milestone 
subsequent to the divorce is, in itself, a "substantial factual change in circumstances" 
which would allow the trial court to modify the Decree of Divorce and award one-half of 
the marital portion of that retirement to Petitioner. 
Although the Court of Appeals held that the "compelling policy interest favoring 
the finality of property settlements" precluded a re-examination of the retirement issue in 
this case, the implied policy upon which that holding is based is in direct conflict with 
the explicit policy set forth by Congress in USFSPA. That Act specifically provides for 
retroactive application in cases such as this. 
In Jacobsen v. Jacobsen. 723 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985) this Court addressed the policy 
implications referred to in the Court of Appeals below when it addressed the applicability 
of the doctrine of res judicata to divorce cases and held that: 
13 
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"When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata to those issues 
which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the party had 
a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." Id. 
at 305. 
In this case, Petitioner had no "fair opportunity" to litigate the issue of dividing the 
retirement asset because it had no value and was not foreseeably likely to mature or vest 
into something of value.1 
The only way for Petitioner to receive a portion of the asset which now has a value 
attributable to the marriage is to allow her to modify the Decree. 
Third Issue 
Writ of Certiorari should issue because the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to find factual changes of circumstances where Petitioner's 
allegations of those changes were unopposed by Respondent. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's finding that Petitioner 
"presented no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances factually." Childs v. 
Callahan. 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 4. However, to reach this conclusion the lower court 
ignored the unrebutted allegations of those changes that were set out in Petitioner's 
affidavits. Specifically, in her affidavit dated November 25, 1998, Petitioner states that at 
the time of the divorce Respondent had been out of the Marine Corps for over 3 years, 
1
 Petitioner does not claim that a retirement must be vested to be divisible, and acknowledges that 
the courts routinely divide retirements that are actually potential future assets at the time of the 
divorce. The difference here is that at the time of the Appellant's divorce, there was no reasonably 
foreseeable likelihood that the retirement fragment earned during the marriage would mature into 
an asset that could ever be divided. However, now that it has matured, by far the largest 
component of its value is the "fragment" that accrued during the marriage of the parties. 
14 
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that he had 13 years service when he separated, that he did not participate in any military 
or reserve duty between 1979 and the divorce in 1982 and that she had no idea at the time 
of the divorce that Respondent had any intention of returning to some form of duty which 
would result in his qualification for a retirement that ultimately utilized the 13 years of 
service which accrued during the marriage. She further alleged that she had only recently 
learned from her children that Respondent had been promoted to Lt. Colonel in the 
Reserves and, on that basis, she believed that he had either accrued 20 years towards 
retirement or, at least, now intended to do so. 
Although the Court of Appeals claims to have construed the facts most favorably 
to Petitioner, and cites Shioji v. Shioji. 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985) as the precedent 
for its not disturbing the findings of the trial court, there is a vast difference between the 
factual determinations in this case and those found in Shioji. The findings in Shioji were 
made after extensive litigation and two appeals. In fact, the findings in the second Shioji 
case cited by the Court of Appeals were initially sent back by this Court for better 
findings of fact. (Shioji v. Shioji. 671 P.2d 135) By comparison, the facts in this case are 
based upon unopposed affidavits and no testimony, documentary or other contradictory 
evidence was even presented to the court for consideration. 
In Shioji Chief Justice Hall did state that the trial court should be given 
"particularly broad discretion". Id. at 201. However, Chief Justice went on to cite 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-512 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that this 
court will "interpose its own judgment... where the trial court's judgment is so 
15 
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flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion." Id. at 201 and 207. Clearly, to find 
contrary to unopposed affidavits constitutes such an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
By extrapolating an implied public policy that directly conflicts with the explicit 
policy set forth by the U.S. Congress, the Court of Appeals erred its application of this 
Court's holding in Woodward v. Woodward. Intervention via certiarori by this Court is 
necessary to correct this error and rectify the inequity which it has generated. Petitioner 
should be allowed to conduct discovery and fully present all facts that substantiate a 
change of circumstances that would clearly lead to the result intended by Congress when 
it enacted USFSPA. 
DATED this /O^ day of January, 2000. 
NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
By: ^?j^S&^l 
NEIL B. CRIST 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the following individual at the address shown, via First 
Class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this fO day of January, 2000: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
Appendix A: Court of Appeals Opinion dated December 9, 1999 
Ruling by Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Appendix B: 10 USCA §1401 
10 USCA §1408 
UCA §30-3-5 
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Diana Childs fka Diane 
Callahan, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
William K. Callahan, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990051-CA 
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(December 9, 1999) 
! 1999 UT App 359 
Second District, Ogden Department 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Attorneys: Leonard E. McGee and Neil B. Crist, Bountiful, for 
Petitioner 
David S. Dolowitz, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Davis. 
WILKINS, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Diana Childs appeals from an order denying her request for 
modification of a divorce decree to permit her to share in 
William Callahan's military retirement pay. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1(2 Childs and Callahan were married in March 1965, and had two 
children during the course of their marriage. In 1966 Callahan 
joined the military on a full-time basis. In 1979, after nearly 
thirteen years of active duty, Callahan left the military. 
U3 In June 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided 
McCartv v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981), holding 
that federal law precluded state courts from dividing military 
retirement benefits under state community property laws. 
However, in 1982, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (amended 
1990), to address the McCartv decision. USFSPA permits the 
former spouse of a military service member to receive up to fifty 
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percent of the service member's retirement benefits. See id. § 
1408(c) (1) . USFSPA became effective in 1983, and affords 
individuals who were divorced between June 26, 1981 and February 
1, 1983 (the McCarty gap), the opportunity to return to court for 
the purpose of claiming a share in their former spouse's military 
retirement benefits. 
U4 The parties in this case were divorced in March 1982 and 
therefore, fall squarely within the McCarty gap. However, at the 
time of the divorce, Callahan was ineligible for military 
retirement benefits because he had accumulated only thirteen 
years of creditable military service. In order to qualify for 
retirement benefits, the military requires its members to 
accumulate at least twenty years of creditable military service, 
either through full-time active duty service or part-time reserve 
service. 
f5 In 1984, Childs issued a subpoena to Callahan inquiring 
about his income, including his "military reserve service." 
Thereafter, Childs filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce, requesting an order increasing Callahan's child support 
obligation which the trial court ultimately granted. Sometime 
after the divorce was finalized, Callahan re-affiliated with the 
military reserves. Childs alleges that Callahan became eligible 
to qualify for military retirement benefits by including the 
thirteen years he served while the parties were married with the 
time he spent in the reserves after the parties divorced. 
f6 In January 1998, Childs read an article that led her to 
believe that she may be entitled to one-half of Callahan's 
military retirement benefits which accrued during the parties' 
marriage. After reading the article, Childs contacted an 
attorney to represent her in this matter. In April 1998, more 
than sixteen years after the divorce was finalized, Childs filed 
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, claiming she had only 
recently discovered she was entitled to a share of Callahan's 
military retirement. Childs asserted that the enactment of.the 
USFSPA, which nullified McCarty, now entitled her to a share of 
Callahan's military retirement benefits. 
f7 Callahan filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 
subsequent legal recognition of pension benefits as marital 
property is not a substantial change of circumstances that would 
justify reopening the parties1 divorce decree. The trial court 
agreed and granted Callahan's motion on the basis that "a change 
in law is not enough to constitute a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying the reopening of a decree of divorce." 
The trial court further concluded that Childs had failed to 
demonstrate a factual change in circumstances that would warrant 
a modification of the decree. Callahan subsequently requested 
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attorney fees on the basis that Childs's claims were without 
merit and asserted in bad faith. The trial court denied 
Callahan's fee request. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1(8 We address two issues on appeal. First, we consider 
whether the trial court erred in holding there had been no 
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify 
reopening the divorce decree. Second, we address whether the 
trial court erred in denying Callahan's request for attorney 
fees. Because both claims are questions of law, we review them 
under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the 
trial court. See Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (stating whether a divorce decree should be reopened 
to divide a military pension is a question of law); Selvage v. 
J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
("Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.'1). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Military Retirement Benefits 
H9 Childs argues that she is entitled to a modification of the 
parties' divorce decree because: (1) USFSPA was enacted in order 
to allow a former spouse of a military service member to receive 
a portion of the service member's retirement benefits; and (2) 
the vesting of Callahan's military retirement benefits 
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances which justifies 
a modification of the divorce decree. We disagree. 
A. Change in Law 
HlO Childs first argues that she is entitled to a share of -
Callahan's military retirement benefits under USFSPA because 
Callahan accumulated a portion of his benefits during the 
parties' marriage and their divorce occurred during the McCarty . 
gap. However, this argument alone does not support Childs's 
request for modification of the divorce decree. In order to 
justify a change or modification of the original divorce decree, 
Childs must demonstrate that "a substantial change in 
circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree." 
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted) . 
Ull In the present case, Childs has failed to show how the 
change in law from McCartv to USFSPA constitutes a substantial 
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change in circumstances. Indeed, this court recently held that 
passage of USFSPA does not constitute a substantial change of 
circumstances that would allow a former wife to reopen a divorce 
decree and obtain a share of her former husband's military 
retirement benefits. See Toone, 952 P.2d at 114; see also 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (stating "legal recognition of a new category of property 
rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself 
sufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances 
justifying a revaluation of a prior property division") . Thus, 
although the parties' divorce was granted in the McCarty gap, and 
could have been reconsidered under USFSPA, the trial court was 
correct in granting Callahan's motion to dismiss in the absence 
of a showing of a material change of circumstances. 
B. Change in Factual Circumstances 
Hl2 Childs further argues that the vesting of Callahan's 
military retirement benefits is a sufficient factual change of 
circumstances to justify modification of the divorce decree. We 
disagree. 
fl3 In this case, the trial court reviewed the "purported 
factual changes, construing them most favorably to [Childs], and 
did not find any material change of circumstances, even by 
including consideration of the changes in law jointly with other 
material facts that had occurred between 1982 and 1998." In 
fact, the trial court specifically found that Childs "presented 
no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances factually." 
The trial court's factual findings underlying its conclusion that 
there was no material change of circumstances are entitled to 
deference. See Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985) 
(stating "[i]n divorce proceedings . . . the trial court is 
accorded particularly broad discretion"). Because these factual 
findings support the conclusion that no material change of 
circumstances existed, we affirm the trial court's decision on 
this issue. 
fl4 Furthermore, public policy supports the trial court's denial 
of Childsfs request for modification of the divorce decree. 
Under Utah law there is a "compelling policy interest favoring 
the finality of property settlements." Toone, 952 P.2d at 114 
(citations omitted); see also Bailey v. Bailev, 745 P.2d 830, 832 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating "potential for long lasting 
financial entanglement is a valid concern in divorce cases"). 
Although the right to seek modification of a divorce decree is 
well settled in Utah, the finality of property settlements is a 
counter-balancing interest that must be considered. Such 
considerations will be highly fact intensive and must be examined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
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fl5 Here, more than thirteen years had passed since the last 
hearing on the parties' divorce decree. The trial court found 
that Childs was "aware that [Callahan] was actively involved in 
the military reserves as early as 1984." Although Childs did not 
learn of her potential entitlement to Callahan's retirement 
benefits until 1998, the length of time that has passed since the 
parties' divorce weighs heavily in favor of denying Childsfs 
request for modification. We therefore affirm the trial court's 
order with respect to retirement benefits. 
II. Attorney Fees 
Hl6 Finally, Callahan asks this court to award him attorney fees^ -
and costs incurred at trial and on appeal.1 Under section 78-27-
56, attorney fees may be awarded if the court determines that an 
action is meritless and brought in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1996) . In order to find that a party acted in bad 
faith, the trial court must determine that at least one of the 
following factors existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief 
in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party 
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the 
party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities 
in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. See Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Ul7 In this case, the trial court specifically found that Childs 
"brought her action believing that she was legally entitled to 
some of [Callahan's] military retirement benefits." The trial 
court also stated that Childs "honestly felt the facts [in this 
case] were substantially distinguishable from the Toone case." 
Callahan does not dispute these factual findings and therefore, 
we accept them as true. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, 
Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Because appellants 
do not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we must 
accept . . . [them] as true."). 
Hi8 Furthermore, the record does not support a finding that 
Childs pursued her claim to hinder, delay, defraud, or take 
unconscionable advantage of Callahan. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 
(holding ill-formed belief in claim does not prove bad faith). 
We hold that Childs's claim was not asserted in bad faith and 
Callahan is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal as a result, 
1. Having not filed a cross appeal on the denial of attorney 
fees below, Appellee has not properly presented the issue here. 
However, the denial of fees below supplies the basis for the 
denial of fees on appeal. As a result, we review the action of 
the trial court regarding attorney fees for that limited purpose 
only. 
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and also "because attorney fees were not awarded below." Baker 
v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Hl9 Because a change in law does not constitute a substantial 
change of circumstances and because Childs has failed to 
demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances factually, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to reopen the 
issue of Callahan's military retirement benefits. Also, we hold 
that Childs's claim was not asserted in bad faith and therefore, 
refuse to award Callahan attorney fees incurred at trial and on 
appeal. 
f20 Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
1(21 WE CONCUR: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of December, 1999, a true 
and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited in the 
United States mail to: 
NEIL 3. CRIST 
LEONARD E. MCGEE 
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
380 N 20G W #260 
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 E 100 S STE 500 
?0 BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147-0008 
and a true and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited 
in the United States mail to the judge listed below: 
Honorable ROGER S. DUTSON 
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT 
2 52 5 GRANT AVE 
OGDEN UT 84401 
Judicial Secretary 
TRIAL COURT: SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT , 82098078 6 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 990051-CA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U J A ^ 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT % ^ 
% '% 
DIANA CHILDS 
fka Diane Callahan, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN, 
Defendant. 
This case is before the court for the purpose of determining whether or not Respondent 
should be awarded attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56 in an action brought 
by Petitioner to have the court amend a decree of divorce by awarding a share of post-divorce 
perfected military retirement. Also, because this is a domestic action, equitable principles could be 
considered in reviewing attorneys fees but because of the courts decision herein, that was not 
necessary. 
The court denied the Petitioners Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce pursuant to the law, 
including the recent case of Toone v Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (1998). 
The parties were divorced in 1982. At that time the Respondent had completed about 13 
years of active military service but was not then eligible for any retirement benefits. About two years 
later in 1984, the Petitioner took Respondent back to court and obtained an increase in child support. 
After the divorce the Respondent purportedly became involved in the military reserves and was 
purportedly able to obtain or is in the process of obtaining retirement benefits by including the 13 
V 
Case No. 820980786 DA 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
% 
RULING <&, S 
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years of active military service while the parties were married. Subsequently the Petitioner became 
aware that the federal law had changed regarding military benefits partially earned during a marriage 
and her potential entitlement to some of those benefits and she sought counsel to attempt to obtain 
what she felt was her portion of the retirement earned during the 13 year they were married and he 
was on active duty. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the laws regarding partially earned military retirements 
in Toone, Ibid in its decision of January 29, 1998, and determined that the change in the laws did not 
amount to a substantial change of circumstances which would justify reopening the divorce decree 
in that case. This court ruled in it's decision dated December 18, 1998 that the law of Toone 
controlled the facts of the present case and dismissed the Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce 
of 1982. 
Petitioner argued that in addition to the change in law discussed in Toone, Ibid, there were 
substantial evidentiary facts that showed a substantial change of circumstances. This court reviewed 
those purported factual changes, construing them most favorably to Petitioner, and did not find any 
material change of circumstances, even by including consideration of the changes in law jointly with 
the other material facts that had occurred between 1982 and 1998. Therefore the court ruled that 
there was not justification to reopen the retirement benefit issues. 
The question now before the court is whether or not attorneys fees should be awarded 
Respondent who asserts the law is so clear as to the issues raised by Petitioner that they amount to 
the raising of issues that are "....without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, ..." (UCA 
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78-27-56) 
This court finds that the claims of Petitioner are clearly without merit and that the legal issues 
were clearly resolved by the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Toone, Ibid, issued on January 29, 
1998, some 3 months before the present action was filed. It does not necessarily follow however, that 
because the legal issues were without merit, the action was brought in "bad faith". This latter issue 
requires consideration of additional factors because it is both a factual and legal issue. 
Petitioner asserts that she was totally unaware of certain potential legal rights to military 
retirement benefits she possessed until about January 1998 and then began searching for counsel who 
could competently handle this issue. She asserts that the attorney representing her in the 1982 
divorce advised her she had no rights to the 13 years potential retirement benefits as there was a U.S. 
Supreme Court preventing her from any benefit therefrom. At the time of the divorce, he was not 
serving in the active military nor military reserves. After contacting several attorneys unsuccessfully, 
she hired Attorney Neil Crist who is a Retired Air Force Colonel who represented he knew about the 
law regarding military retirement benefits as they relate to divorce cases. Prior to the hearing on 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss, the Petitioner and her attorney went over the facts of Toone, Ibid 
and concluded that the facts of that case were distinguishable from her case and therefore, they 
concluded they wanted this court to make a decision in this matter. The court notes that it is apparent 
that Petitioner was previously aware that Respondent was actively involved in the military reserves 
as early as 1984 because at that time when she was getting the child support increased she issued a 
subpoena to Respondent asking about his income, including his "...military reserve service." The 
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court further finds that it would not have been difficult for her to determine that the 13 years of active 
military service during their marriage would have counted for any retirement benefits he might obtain 
through additional reserve involvement and the court can take judicial notice of the law governing 
that fact. However, it would have been more difficult for her to obtain information regarding and an 
understanding of her legal right to claim any such retirement benefits. 
For purposes of the record this court has carefully reviewed the evidence submitted by 
Respondent concerning reasonable attorneys fees incurred by him and finds them to be reasonable. 
Further, the court has not considered the financial positions of either party as it relates to the ability 
to pay attorneys fees nor any equitable factors relating thereto. 
The court does find from the foregoing facts and a full review of the affidavits submitted in 
this case that the Petitioner brought her action believing that she was legally entitled to some of the 
military retirement benefits the Respondent could potentially receive. The court finds that she 
honestly felt the facts were substantially distinguishable from the Toone case, even though the court 
does not so find. On the other hand, because the present state of the law in Utah does clearly 
preclude the claims presented, application of the clear rule of law to the facts of this case make it a 
very close issue, though that issue is resolved in favor of Petitioner and attorneys fees are denied. 
Of course, the appellate courts will be left to determine costs and attorneys fees on any appeal that 
might be pursued. 
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zTd DATED this AS? day of March, 1999. 
ROGER S/DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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§ 1401 TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES Page 794 
In subsection (a), the words "who are in the Retired 
Reserve" are substituted for 50:927(a) (last 11 words), 
since section 271 of this title prescribes the conditions 
for being placed in the Retired Reserve. 50:927(b) (last 
sentence) is omitted, since the revised section provides 
that both lists be maintained. 
In subsection (b), the words "containing the names 
placed thereon under section 1202 or 1205 of this title" 
are substituted for the words "upon which shall be 
placed the names of all members of his service entitled 
to such placement pursuant to the provisions of this 
subchapter". 
1958 ACT 
Revised 
section 
1376 
Sourer (U.S. Code) 
[Uncodified]. 
Sourer (Statutes at 
Large) 
July 24. 1956. ch. 677. 
5 2 (less clauses (aMi) , 
as applicable to 
10:1376). 70 Sta t . 623. 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Pub. L. 103-337 substituted "Temporary dis-
ability retired lists" for "Retired lists" as section 
catchline. struck out "(b)" before "The Secretary con-
cerned", and struck out subsec. (a) which read as fol-
lows: "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned, there shall be maintained retired lists con-
taining the names of the Reserves of the armed forces 
under his jurisdiction who are in the Retired Re-
serve." See section 12774 of this title. 
1958—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 85-861 struck out provi-
sions requiring publication of the temporary disability 
retired list annually in the official register or other of-
ficial publication of the armed force concerned. 
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1. 
1994. except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1431 of this 
title; title 33 section 857a; title 42 section 213a. 
CHAPTER 71—COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY 
Sec. 
1401. Computation of retired pay. 
1401a. Adjustment of retired pay and retainer pay 
to reflect changes in Consumer Price 
Index. 
1402. Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to 
reflect later active duty of members who 
first became members before September 8. 
1980. 
1402a. Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to 
reflect later active duty of members who 
first became members after September 7. 
1980. 
1403. Disability retired pay: treatment under In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986. 
1404. Applicability of section 8301 of title 5. 
1405. Years of service. 
1406. Retired pay base for members who first 
became members before September 8. 1980: 
final basic pay. 
1407. Retired pay base for members who first 
became members after September 7. 1980: 
high-36 month average. 
Sec. 
1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compli-
ance with court orders.' 
1409. Retired pay multiplier. 
1410. Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62 
for members entering on or after August 1. 
1986. 
1411. Rules of construction. 
1412. Rounding to next lower dollar. 
AMENDMENTS 
1987—Pub. L. 100-26. § 7(h)(2)(B). Apr. 21. 1987, 101 
Stat. 282. substituted colon for semicolon and "Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954" in item 1403. 
1986-Pub. L. 99-348. title III, 5 304(b)(2), July 1, 
1986, 100 Stat. 703. inserted "of members who first 
became members before September 8, 1980" in item 
1402. substituted "Retired pay base for members who 
first became members before September 8, 1980: final 
basic pay" for "Limitations on revocation of retired 
pay" in item 1406 and "Retired pay base for members 
who first became members after September 7. 1980: 
high-36 month average" for "Retired pay base" in 
item 1407. and added items 1409 to 1412. 
1982-Pub. L. 97-252, title X. 5 1002(b). Sept. 8, 1982, 
96 Stat. 735. added item 1408. 
1980-Pub. L. 96-513, title V. 5 51K51XC). (52)(C). 
Dec. 12. 1980, 94 Stat. 2924, 2925. substituted "of mem-
bers who first became members after September 7, 
1980" for "in case of members who first became mem-
bers after the enactment of the Department of De-
fense Authorization Act, 1981" in item 1402a, and sub-
stituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" for "title 
26" in item 1403. 
Pub. L. 96-342. title VIII, § 813(a)(2). (b)(3)(B). 94 
Stat. 1101. 1104, added items 1402a and 1407. 
1966—Pub. L. 89-718. 5 3. Nov. 2. 1966. 80 Stat. 1115. 
substituted "8301" for "47a" in item 1404. 
Pub. L. 89-652. §2(2), Oct. 14. 1966. 80 Stat. 902. 
added item 1406. 
1963—Pub. L. 88-132. § 5(g)(2), Oct. 2. 1963. 77 Stat. 
214. added item 1401a. 
1958-Pub. L. 85-422. § 11(a)(1)(B). May 20, 1958. 72 
Stat. 131. added item 1405. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Length of service retirement, computation of retired 
pay. see section 1315 of this title. 
Physical disability retirement or separation, compu-
tation of retired pay. see section 1275 of this title. 
Transfer to inactive status list instead of separation, 
see section 1209 of this title. 
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This chapter is referred to in sections 642, 1209. 
1275. 1315 of this title; title 33 section 857a; title 42 
section 213a. 
§ 1401. Computation of retired pay 
(a) DISABILITY. NON-REGULAR SERVICE, WAR-
RANT OFFICER, AND DOPMA RETIREMENT.—The 
monthly retired pay of a person entitled there-
to under this subtitle is computed according to 
the following table. For each case covered by a 
section of this title named in the column 
headed "For sections", retired pay is computed 
by taking, in order, the steps prescribed oppo-
site it in columns 1. 2, 3, and 4, as modified by 
the applicable footnotes. 
• Section catchline amended by Pub. L. 102-190 without corre-
sponding amendment of chapter analysis. 
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633 1 
634 
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1251 
Column 1 
1 Take 
Retired pay base as computed | under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
Retired pay base as computed 
under section 1406(b) or 1407. 
j Coitimn 2 
Multiply by 
As member elects— 
(1) 2'/..% of years of s e n -
Ice credited to him under 
section 1208: ' or 
(2) the percentage of dis-
ability on dale when re-
tired. 
As member elects— 
(1) 2'/t% of years of serv-
ice credited to him under 
section 1208: ' or 
(2) the percentage of dis-
ability on date when his 
name was placed on tempo-
rary disability retired list. 
The retired pay multiplier 
prescribed in section 
1409(a) for the years of 
service credited to him 
under section 1405. 
The retired pay multiplier 
prescribed in section 
1409(a) for the years of 
service credited to him 
under section 1405. 
Column 3 
1 Add 
Amount necessary to 
increase product of 
columns 1 and 2 to 
50% of retired pay 
base upon which 
computation is 
based. 
! Column 4 
1 Subtract 
1 Excess over 75% of 
i retired pay base 
upon which 
computation Is 
based. 
Excess over 75% of 
retired pay base 
upon which 
computation is 
based. 
1
 Before applying percentage factor, credit each full month of service that is in addition to the number of full years of service 
creditable to the member as one-twelfth of a year and disregard any remaining fractional part of a month. 
:(b) U S E OF MOST FAVORABLE FORMULA.—If a 
person would otherwise be entitled to retired 
pay computed under more than one formula of 
the table in subsection (a) or of any other pro-
vision of law, the person is entitled to be paid 
under the applicable formula that is most fa-
vorable to him. 
(Aug. 10. 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 106; May 20, 
1958. Pub. L. 85-422, §§6(7), 11(a)(2), 72 Stat. 
129, 131; Oct. 2, 1963, Pub. L. 88-132, § 5(h)(1). 
77 Stat. 214; Aug. 21, 1965, Pub. L. 89-132, § 6, 
79 Stat. 547; Dec. 16, 1967, Pub. L. 90-207. 
§ 3(1), 81 Stat. 653; Oct. 2, 1972, Pub. L. 92-455, 
§ 1, 86 Stat. 761; Sept. 8, 1980, Pub. L. 96-342, 
title VIII. § 813(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1102; Dec. 12. 
1980. Pub. L. 96-513. title I. § 113(a). title V, 
§511(49). 94 Stat. 2876. 2924; Sept. 24, 1983, 
Pub. L. 98-94. title IX. §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a)(1). 
(2)(A), 97 Stat. 641. 642; Oct. 30. 1984, Pub. L. 
98-557, § 35(b), 98 Stat. 2877; July 1, 1986, Pub. 
L. 99-348, title II, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 691; Oct. 
23, 1992. Pub. L. 102-484, div. A. title X. 
§ 1052(18), 106 Stat. 2500; Oct. 5, 1994, Pub. L. 
103-337, div. A, title XVI, § 1662(j)(2), 108 Stat. 
3004.) 
H I S T O R I C A L AND R E V I S I O N N O T E S 
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES—Continued 
Revised 
section 
1401(2) 
1401(3). 
1401(4) 
1401. 
foot-
note 1. 
1401. 
foot-
note 2. 
1401. 
foot-
note 3. 
Source (U.S. Code) 
37:272(d) (1st 29. and 
51st through 55th. 
words, and 4th provi-
so). 
10:1036b (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 
34:440j (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 
10:600/(d) (2d sentence). 
10:600Kf) (last sen-
tence). 
34.430(d) (2d sentence). 
34:430(f) (last sentence). 
(No source]. 
[No source]. 
37:272(d) (1st proviso); 
i0:600/(d) (less 1st and 
2d sentences). 
34:430(d) (less 1st and 
2d sentences). 
Source (Statutes at 
Large) 
May 29. 1954. ch. 249. 
i 14(d) (less 1st sen-
tence), (f) (1st sen-
tence, less applicabil-
ity to retired grade: 
and last sentence). 68 
Stat. 163. 164. 
Revised 
section 
1401 
• Intro-
duc-
tory 
clause. 
1401(1). 
Source (U.S. Code) 
10:600/(f) (1st sentence, 
less applicability to re-
tired grade). 
34:430(f) (1st sentence, 
less applicability to re-
tired grade). 
37:272(d) (less 1st 55 
words: less 104th 
through 128th words, 
as applicable to re-
tired grade: and less 
1st. 2d. 4th. 5th. and 
last provisos). 
Source (Statutes at 
Large) 
June 29. 1948. ch. 708. 
§303 (1st 91 words 
and 1st proviso). 62 
Stat. 1088. 
Oct. 12. 1949. ch. 681. 
§§402(d) (less 30th 
through 55th words: 
less 104th through 
128th words, as appli-
cable to retired grade: 
and less 2d. 5th. and 
last provisos). 402(e) (1st proviso of last 
In the introductory paragraph, the applicability of 
the rule stated in the third sentence to situations not 
expressly covered by the laws named in the source 
statutes above is a practical construction that the rule 
must be reciprocally applied in all cases. 
In formula No. 1, the words "whichever is earlier", 
in 37:272(d) (clause (2)). are omitted, since they are 
contrary to the rule stated in 37:272(e) (1st proviso of 
last sentence). 
In formula No. 3, the computation is based on 
monthly pay instead of annual pay to conform to the 
other formulas of the revised section. The words 
"basic pay" are substituted for the words "base and 
longevity pay" to conform to the terminology of the 
Career Compensation Act of 1949 (37 U.S.C. 231 et 
seq.). The words "which he would receive if serving, at 
the time granted such pay, on active duty" are omit-
ted as surplusage and to conform to the other formu-
las of the revised section, since the effect of these 
words is covered by footnote l.-The words "at any 
time" are substituted for the words "during his entire 
period of service". 
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REFERENCES IN TEXT 
Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsecs. 
(c)'.l) and (d)(1). was renumbered section 12731 of this 
title and amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337. div. A. 
title XVI. §1662(j)(l). Oct. 5. 1994. 108 Stat. 2998, 
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section 
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337. 
Chapter 67 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(1). 
was transferred to part II of subtitle E of this title, re-
numbered as chapter 1223, and amended generally by 
Pub. L. 103-337. div. A, title XVI. § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5. 
1994. 108 Stat. 2998. A new chapter 67 (§ 1331) of this 
title was added by section 1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 
103-337. 
PRIOR PROVISIONS 
A prior section 1407. added Pub. L. 96-342. title VIII. 
§ 813(a)(1). Sept. 8. 1980, 94 Stat. 1100: amended Pub. 
L. 96-513. title I. § 113(c). title V. §§501(21). 511(53). 
Dec. 12. 1980. 94 Stat. 2877, 2908. 2925. related to de-
termination of retired base pay, prior to repeal by-
Pub. L. 99-348. § 104(b). 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 103-337. 
§ 1662(j)(5)(A). which directed substitution of "chap-
ter 1223" for "chapter 67", could not be executed be-
cause the words "chapter 67" did not appear subse-
quent to amendment by Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2). 
(4). See 1989 Amendment note below. 
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337, § 1662(j)(5)(B). which 
directed amendment of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting 
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "sec-
tion 12731" for "section 1331" in text, could not be ex-
ecuted because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by 
Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2). See 1989 Amendment note 
below. 
1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(1). (b)(2). 
substituted "person" for "member", "person's" for 
"members", and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsec-
tion (c)". 
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). (4). added 
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which re-
lated to computation of high-three average. 
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(4). added 
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e). 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). (3), redesig-
nated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck out former subsec. 
(e) which related to special rules for short-term dis-
ability retirees. 
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2). struck 
out subsec. (f) which related to special rule for mem-
bers retiring with non-regular service, and subsec. (g) 
which defined the term "years of creditable service". 
EFTECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1, 
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1401. 1402a. 
3991. 3992. 6151. 6333. 6334, 8991, 8992. 12739 of this 
title: title 14 sections 357, 423, 424: title 33 section 
853o; title 42 sections 211. 212. 
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compli-
ance with court orders 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: , 
(1) The term "court" means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as de-
fined in section 451 of title 28) having conn 
petent jurisdiction: and ' 
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
a foreign country with which the United 
States has an agreement requiring the 
United States to honor any court order of 
such country. 
(2) The term "court order" means a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation issued by a court, or a court 
ordered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such a decree (including a 
final decree modifying the terms of a prevl-* 
ously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, an-
nulment, or legal separation, or a court or-
dered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such previously issued 
decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws 
of the jurisdiction of that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined 
in section 462(b) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in 
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act 
(42U.S.C. 662(c))); or 
(iii) division of property (including a di-
vision of community property); and 
(C) in the case of a division of property, 
specifically provides for the payment of an 
amount, expressed in dollars or as a per-
centage of disposable retired pay, from the 
disposable retired pay of a member to the 
spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree 
from which no appeal may be taken or from 
which no appeal has been taken within the 
time allowed for taking such appeals under 
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been 
taken and such appeal has been finally decid-
ed under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" 
means the total monthly retired pay to which 
a~friember is entitled less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the 
United States for previous overpayments of 
retired pay and for recoupments required 
by law resulting from entitlement to retired 
pay; 
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of 
such member as a result of forfeitures of re-
tired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a 
result of a waiver of retired pay required by 
law in order to receive compensation under 
title 5 or title 38; 
(C) in the case of a member entitled to re-
tired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are 
equal to the amount of retired pay of the 
member under that chapter computed using 
the percentage of the member's disability 
on the date when the member was retired 
(or the date on which the member's name 
was placed on the temporary disability re-
tired list); or 
(D) are deducted because of an election 
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an 
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to 
whom payment of a portion of such mem-
ber's retired pay is being made pursuant to 
a court order under this section. 
(5) The term "member" includes a former 
member entitled to retired pay under section 
1331 » of this title. 
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" 
means the husband or wife, or former hus-
band or wife, respectively, of a member who, 
on or before the date of a court order, was 
married to that member. 
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer 
pay. 
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—For the 
purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary 
concerned designated for receipt of service 
of court orders under regulations prescribed 
pursuant to subsection (i) or, if* no agent 
has been so designated, the Secretary con-
cerned, is personally served or is served by 
certified or registered mail, return receipt 
requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(C) the court order or other documents 
served with the court order identify the 
member concerned and include, if possible, 
the social security number of such member; 
and 
(D) the court order or other documents 
served with the court order certify that the 
rights of the member under the Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 
U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the 
order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent juris-
diction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(C) includes nothing on its face that pro-
vides reasonable notice that it is issued 
without authority of law. 
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT TO TREAT RETIRED 
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.— 
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may treat disposable retired pay payable 
to a member for pay periods beginning after 
June 25. 1981, either as property solely of the 
member or as property of the member and his 
spouse in accordance with the law of the juris-
diction of such court. A court may not treat re-
tired pay as property in any proceeding to 
divide or partition any amount of retired pay of 
a member as the property of the member and 
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation (including a court ordered, rati-
fied, or approved property settlement incident 
to such decree) affecting the member and the 
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was 
issued before June 25. 1981. and (B) did not 
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any 
amount of retired pay of the member as proper-
ty of the member and the member's spouse or 
former spouse. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law. this section does not create any right, title, 
or interest which can be sold, assigned, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by 
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Pay-
ments by the Secretary concerned under sub-
section (d) to a spouse or former spouse with re-
spect to a division of retired pay as the proper-
ty of a member and the member's spouse under 
this subsection may not be treated as amounts 
received as retired pay for service in the uni-
formed services. ******** 
(3) This section does not authorize any court 
to order a member to apply for retirement or 
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate 
any payment under this section. 
(4) A court may not treat the disposable re-
tired pay of a member in the manner described 
in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdic-
tion over the member by reason of (A) his resi-
dence, other than because of military assign-
ment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED To 
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective 
service on the Secretary concerned of a court 
order providing for the payment of child sup-
port or alimony or, with respect to a division of 
property, specifically providing for the pay-
ment of an amount of the disposable retired 
pay from a member to the spouse or a former 
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall 
make payments (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse in 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of 
child support and alimony set forth in the 
court order and, with respect to a division of 
property, in the amount of disposable retired 
pay specifically provided for in the court order. 
In the case of a member entitled to receive re-
tired pay on the date of the effective service of 
the court order, such payments shall begin not 
later than 90 days after the date of effective 
service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall 
begin not later than 90 days after the date on 
which the member first becomes entitled to re-
ceive retired pay. 
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are to be made under this section was 
not married to the member for a period of 10 
years or more during which the member per-
formed at least 10 years of service creditable in 
determining the member's eligibility for retired 
pay, payments may not be made under this sec-
tion to the extent that they include an amount 
resulting from the treatment by the court 
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of 
the member as property of the member or 
property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be 
made more frequently than once each month, 
and the Secretary concerned shall not be re-
s*.i.*.<-ts4 f « m,nr*yr n r t o m n l n o \t Q T l H H i c K l i r C O m O T l t 
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay 
of a member pursuant to this section shall ter-
minate in accordance with the terms of the ap-
plicable court order, but not later than the date 
of the death of the member or the date of the 
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are being made, whichever occurs 
first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) 
provides for a division of property (including a 
division of community property) in addition to 
an amount of child support or alimony or the 
payment of an amount of disposable retired 
pay as the result of the court's treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of 
the member and his spouse, the Secretary con-
cerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse of 
the member, any part of the amount payable to 
the spouse or former spouse under the division 
of property upon effective service of a final 
court order of garnishment of such amount 
from such retired pay. 
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the 
disposable retired pay of a member payable 
under all court orders pursuant to subsection 
(c) may not exceed 50 percent of such dispos-
able retired pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more 
than one court order which provide for pay-
ment to a spouse and one or more former 
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the 
disposable retired pay of the member shall be 
used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-
come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall 
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of para-
graph (1)) out of that amount of disposable re-
tired pay which remains after the satisfaction 
of all court orders which have been previously 
served. 
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of con-
flicting court orders under this section which 
assert to direct that different amounts be paid 
during a month to the same spouse or former 
spouse of the same member, the Secretary con-
cerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse from the members 
disposable retired pay the least amount di-
rected to be paid during that month by any 
such conflicting court order, but not more 
than the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of such 
court orders based on when such court orders 
were effectively served and the limitations of 
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of para-
graph (4); 
(jdXretain an amount of disposable retired 
p5y tnarf is equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest 
amount required by any conflicting court 
order to be paid to the spouse or former 
spouse and the amount payable to the 
spouse or former spouse under clause (i);^ 
and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of any 
conflicting court order based on when such 
court order was effectively served and the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which 
is equal to the amount of that member's dis-
posable retired pay (less any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to legal process 
served under section 459 of the Social Securi-
ty Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to court orders 
effectively served under this section, other 
than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay 
paid under clause (i): and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
retained under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the 
amount retained under clause (ii) of subpara-
graph (A) until such time as that Secretary is 
provided with a court order which has been cer-
tified by the member and the spouse or former 
spouse to be valid and applicable to the re-
tained amount. Upon being provided with such 
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained 
amount in accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a 
court order under this section and the service 
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of 
which provide for payments during a month 
from the same member, satisfaction of such 
court orders and legal process from the retired 
pay of the member shall be on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal 
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which 
are subject to such orders and legal process and 
which remain available in accordance with the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph 
(B) of this paragraph during such month after 
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal proc-
ess which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the total amount of the disposable retired 
pay of a member payable by the Secretary con-
cerned under all court orders pursuant to this 
section and all legal processes pursuant to sec-
tion 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659) with respect to a member may not exceed 
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay 
payable to such member that is considered 
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment 
that is payable by the United States. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of 
previously served court orders provides for the 
payment of an amount which exceeds the 
amount of disposable retired pay available for 
payment because of the limit set forth in para-
graph (1), or which, because of previously 
served court orders or legal process previously 
served under section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an 
amount that exceeds the maximum amount 
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to 
be irregular on its face solely for that reason. 
However, such order shall be considered to be 
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by 
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of 
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay 
permitted under paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 819 TITLE 10-ARMED FORCES §1408 
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to relieve a member of liability for the payment 
of alimony, child support, or other payments 
required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired pay 
under this section have been made in the maxi-
mum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such 
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be en-
forced by any means available under law other 
than the means provided under this section in 
any case in which the maximum amount per-
mitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and 
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF 
UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any 
officer or employee of the United States shall 
not be liable with respect to any payment made 
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or 
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is 
regular on its face if such payment is made in 
accordance with this section and the regula-
tions prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United 
States who, under regulations prescribed pursu-
ant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to 
interrogatories shall not be subject under any 
law to any disciplinary action or civil or crimi-
nal liability or penalty for, or because of, any 
disclosure of information made by him in carry-
ing out any of his duties which directly or indi-
rectly pertain to answering such interrogato-
ries. 
(g) NOTICE TO MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT 
ORDER ON SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-
ceiving effective service of a court order under 
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not 
later than 30 days after the date on which ef-
fective service is made, send a written notice of 
such court order (together with a copy of such 
order) to the member affected by the court 
order at his last known address. 
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO ARE VIC-
TIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO 
RETIRED PAY.—(1) If, in the case of a member or 
former member of the armed forces referred to 
in paragraph (2XA), a court order provides (in 
the manner applicable to a division of property) 
for the payment of an amount from the dispos-
able retired pay of that member or former 
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to 
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that 
member or former member, the Secretary con-
cerned, beginning upon effective service of such 
court order, shall pay that amount in accord-
ance with this subsection to such spouse or 
former spouse. 
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or 
former member of the armed forces is eligible 
to receive payment under this subsection if— 
(A) the member or former member, while a 
member of the armed forces and after becom-
ing eligible to be retired from the armed 
forces on the basis of years of service, has eli-
gibility to receive retired pay terminated as a 
result of misconduct while a memher invniv. 
retary of Defense or. for the Coast Guard 
when it is not operating as a service in the 
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation); 
and 
* (B) the spouse or former spouse— 
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was 
married to the member or former member 
at the time of that abuse; or 
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a de-
pendent child of the member or former 
member who was the victim of the jf&ttjffc*** 
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary 
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to 
a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be 
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that 
member or former member for the purposes of 
this subsection. 
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible 
spouse or former spouse of a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil 
action for the issuance of a court order in the 
case of that member or former member, the 
Secretary concerned shall determine and certi-
fy the amount of the monthly retired pay that 
the member or former member would have 
been entitled to receive as of the date of the 
certification— 
(A) if the member or former member's eligi-
bility for retired pay had not been terminated 
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and 
(B) if, in the case of a member or former 
member not in receipt of retired pay immedi-
ately before that termination of eligibility for 
retired pay, the member or former member 
had retired on the effective date of that ter-
mination of eligibility. 
(5) A court order under this subsection may 
provide that whenever retired pay is increased 
under section 1401a of this title (or any other 
provision of law), the amount payable under 
the court order to the spouse or former spouse 
of a member or former member described in 
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same 
time by the percent by which the retired pay of 
the member or former member would have 
been increased if the member or former 
member were receiving retired pay. 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall 
have no ownership interest in, or claim against, 
any amount payable under this section to a 
spouse or former spouse of the member or 
former member. 
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments 
under this subsection with respect to a member 
or former member referred to in paragraph 
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin, 
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive 
further payments under this subsection shall 
terminate on the date of such marriage. 
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments 
under this subsection that is terminated under 
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first 
day of the month in which that marriage is so 
terminated. The monthly amount of the pay-
ments shall be the amount that would have 
been paid if the continuity of the payments 
had not been interrupted by the marriage. 
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsec-
tion shall be made out of funds in the Depart-
ment of Defense Military Retirement Fund es-
tablished by section 1461 of this title or, in the 
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropri-
ated to the Department of Transportation for 
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. 
OKA) A spouse or former spouse of a member 
or former member of the armed forces referred 
to in paragraph (2XA), while receiving pay-
ments in accordance with this subsection, shall 
be entitled to receive medical and dental care, 
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to 
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a 
former spouse of a retired member of the 
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis 
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case 
may be, of a retired member of the armed 
forces in the same manner as if the member or 
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) 
was entitled to retired pay. 
(B) A dependent child of a member or former 
member referred to in paragraph (2KA) who 
was a member of the household of the member 
or former member at the time of the miscon-
duct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be en-
titled to receive medical and dental care, to use 
commissary and exchange stores, and to have 
other benefits provided to dependents of re-
tired members of the armed forces in the same 
manner as if the member or former member re-
ferred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to re-
tired pay. 
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a depend-
ent child eligible or entitled to receive a par-
ticular benefit under this paragraph is eligible 
or entitled to receive that benefit under an-
other provision of law, the eligibility or entitle-
ment of that spouse or former spouse or de-
pendent child to such benefit shall be deter-
mined under such other provision of law in-
stead of this paragraph. 
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the 
case of a member of the armed forces who has 
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a 
punishment that will terminate the eligibility 
of that member to receive retired pay if execut-
ed, the eligibility of that member to receive re-
tired pay may, as determined by the Secretary 
concerned, be considered terminated effective 
upon the approval of that sentence by the 
pereort1«fcWgJunder section 860(c) of this title 
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice). 
(B) If each form of the punishment that 
would result in the termination of eligibility to 
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, 
or mitigated to a punishment that does not 
result in the termination of that eligibility, a 
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient 
under this subsection that is based on the pun-
ishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall 
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effec-
tive as of the first day of the first month fol-
lowing the month in which the Secretary con-
cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in 
writing that payment of the benefits will cease. 
The recipient may not be required to repay the 
benefits received before that effective date 
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any 
amount that was erroneous when paid). 
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent 
child", with respect to a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legiti-
mate child, including an adopted child or a 
stepchild of the member or former member, 
who— 
(A) is under 18 years of age: 
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a 
mental or physical incapacity that existed 
before becoming 18 years of age and is de-
pendent on the member or former member 
for over one-half of the child's support; or 
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study 
in an institution of higher education recog-
nized by the Secretary of Defense for the 
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23 
years of age and is dependent on the member 
or former member for over one-half of the 
child's support. 
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned 
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the ad-
ministration of this section. 
(Added Pub. L. 97-252, title X. § 1002(a), Sept. 
8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
title VI, §643(a)-(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 
2547; Pub. L. 99-661, div. A, title VI, § 644(a), 
Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3887; Pub. L. 100-26, 
§§ 3(3), 7(h)(1), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, 282; 
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title VI, § 653(a)(5), title 
XVI, § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29, 1989. 103 Stat. 1462, 
1605; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1569, 
1570; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X, 
§ 1061(a)(7), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472; Pub. L. 
102-484, div. A, title VI, § 653(a), Oct. 23, 1992, 
106 Stat. 2426; Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a). (b), title XI, § 1182(a)(2), Nov. 30, 1993, 
107 Stat. 1666. 1771.) 
REFERENCES IN TEXT 
Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec. 
(a)(5). was renumbered section 12731 of this title and 
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title 
XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5. 1994. 108 Stat. 2998. 2999. A 
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(j)(7) of 
Pub. L. 103-337. 
The Soldiers* and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. referred 
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D). is act Oct. 17. 1940. ch. 888. 54 
Stat. 1178. as amended, which is classified to section 
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50. War and Na-
tional Defense. For complete classification of this Act 
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title 
50 and Tables. 
AMENDMENTS 
4993—Subsecs. (b)(1)(A). (f)(1). (2). Pub. L. 103-160. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A). substituted "subsection (l)" for "sub-
section (h)". 
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160. § 555(b)(1). insert-
ed "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as 
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion" after "Secretary of Defense". 
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160. 5 1182(a)(2)(B). 
inserted "of" after "of that termination". 
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Utah Code § 30-3-5 liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE (iii) provisions for the enforcement of these 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE orders; and 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-
Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children—Division of debts—Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction-
Custody and visitation—Determination 
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a 
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is 
responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties 
contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
•espective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or 
(d) provisions for income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order 
determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of 
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
If the court determines that the circumstances 
are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include 
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of 
parents, grandparents, and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the 
need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court 
ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child 
custody or visitation provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, the court shall order the 
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petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial 
noncompliance with a visitation order by a 
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the 
immediate family pursuant to Section 
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously grafted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by 
the prevailing party because of the other party's 
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation. 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the 
parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to 
the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a mamage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a 
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue 
a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living 
expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spTouse if the court finds that the 
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payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that 
the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 284; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232. § 4, eff. July 1, 1997. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c. 330 provides: 
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of 
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in 
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in 
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose." 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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